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Verhinderte oder sabotierte Ermittlungen von FBI-Agenten

Kurzfassend kann man sagen, je näher jemand beim FBI dem Plot kam, desto weiter weg von der Zentrale fand man sich wieder. Bestes Beispiel ist Nancy Floyd, die in die Provinz versetzt wurde, weil sie zu "gute" Kontakte zu Emad Salem hatte. Oder John O'Neill, der ganz aus dem FBI rausgemobbt wurde, obwohl das FBI sein Leben war. In der 911 Timeline habe ich [bis] jetzt ca. 200 Gelegenheiten entdeckt, wo die Ermittlungen bewusst so sabotiert wurden, dass man die 9/11 Zellen coverte. Die FBI Agenten nannten diese schon vor dem 11.9.2001, "the wall", die Mauer. Hier möchte ich all diese Gelegenheiten sammeln.

Erstmal die großen: All diese Agenten waren dem Plot auf der Spur, allen Fällen ist gemein, dass die Ermittlungen von Oben behindert wurden, dass es keine Reaktion seitens der Superiors gab, und dass die Agenten dafür sogar bestraft wurden, sich damit zu beschäftigen (siehe Rowley, Floyd)Kenneth Williams mit den Phoenix Memos.[1]

Coleen Rowley
[2] Harry Samit, der die Vorgesetzten bis zu 70 Mal gewarnt haben will. [3] Robert Wright [4] Die schon erwähnte Nancy Floyd. [5] Aber natürlich Topbeispiel immer noch John O'Neill, der aus Verhinderungsgründen in seine Ermittlung und einer gefakten Kampagne gegen ihn aus Frust seinen Job als Bin Laden-Jäger an den Nagel hing. Über ihn müssen wir wohl nicht mehr ausführlich reden, dürfte allgemein bekannt sein. Falls jemand doch noch nicht seine Story kennt: 18 Hier die Einzelgelegenheiten, wo man klar erkennen kann, dass Informationen bewusst nicht weitergegeben worden sind, um den Plot zu decken. Vorab zur Info: Ich bin nicht fertig geworden und habe nach 46 Punkten aufgegeben, und ich war nicht mal bei der Hälfte. Wer will, kann diese Punkte gerne überspringen und bis Seite 24 scrollen. Ich habe sie trotzdem drin gelassen, viele machen sich ja einfach nicht die Mühe und lesen wie ich nächtelang die 9/11 Timeline von Paul Thompson thematisch zielgerichtet durch. 1: After the FBI learns of the Millennium plots to attack targets in Jordan (see November 30, 1999), it sends a team of agents to investigate. The team looks at the work the local CIA station has done on the bombing and finds that the reports it has been sending to the US are deeply flawed; twelve cables sent to CIA headquarters are subsequently withdrawn. 2: FBI agent Ali Soufan finds a box of evidence delivered by Jordanian partners on the floor of the CIA’s Amman station. Nobody has examined the box, but Soufan finds it contains key evidence, such as a map of the proposed bomb sites. 3: Around eight calls made by hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from San Diego to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, owned by his father-in-law are intercepted by the NSA. At least one of the calls is made from a phone registered to hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi in their San Diego apartment; other calls are made from a mobile phone registered to Alhazmi. Although NSA analysts pick up his first name, “Khalid,” they do not connect it to his second name, even though the NSA has been intercepting communications to and from the hub involving him throughout 1999 (see Early 1999 and December 29, 1999) and he is on the NSA watch list at this point (see Mid-January 2000) 4: According to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, the NSA disseminates some of this information to the FBI, CIA, and other agencies, but not all of it, as it apparently does not meet reporting thresholds. 5: Soufan wonders why money was being sent away from the Cole plotters and away from Yemen prior to a major planned attack and speculates that it may mean another al-Qaeda operation is being planned elsewhere. Soufan asks the CIA for information about Khallad and this other attack, which turns out to be 9/11, but the CIA withholds the information (see Late November 2000) 19 6: The detained men, Jamal Badawi and Fahad al-Quso, say that they recently traveled to Afghanistan and met bin Attash there. Badawi also says bin Attash helped purchase a boat used in the Cole bombing. The head of the FBI’s investigation, Ali Soufan, is startled by this news, as an informer has already provided information on bin Attash, describing him as one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants. Although the FBI wants to interview the two detained men to obtain more information, the Yemeni authorities refuse at this point, saying they have both sworn on the Koran they were not involved in the attack, so they must be innocent. Limited access to al-Quso will be granted to the FBI later, but the Yemeni authorities will indicate to him that he is still under their protection (see Early December 2000). 7: Based on information obtained during the investigation of the USS Cole bombing (see Late October-Late November 2000), the FBI asks the CIA for information about al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash and a possible al-Qaeda meeting in Southeast Asia in early 2000, but the CIA withholds the information. The request is sent by FBI Director Louis Freeh on behalf of agent Ali Soufan, who is working on the Cole investigation. Soufan began to suspect such a meeting may have taken place when he learned that two of the operatives involved in the bombing had taken money out of Yemen to give to bin Attash in Thailand before the attack (see January 8-15, 2000), making him think the money may have been intended for a bigger plot. The CIA is highly aware of the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), which was considered so important that CIA Director George Tenet and other CIA leaders were repeatedly briefed about it (see January 6-9, 2000). The CIA has photos of bin Attash and al-Quso attending the meeting (see January 6-9, 2000), which took place only a few days before al-Quso’s meeting with bin Attash in Thailand. Yet the CIA does not respond to Soufan’s clearly stated request. 8: In late October 2000, al-Qaeda operative Fahad al-Quso was interrogated by authorities in Yemen, and FBI agent Ali Soufan was able to use that information to discover the identity of one of the USS Cole bombing masterminds, Khallad bin Attash Soufan asks the CIA for information about bin Attash, but the CIA wrongly claims it knows nothing, and doesn’t even tell Soufan of the Malaysia summit that it had closely monitored 9: John O’Neill correctly believes that al-Quso is still holding back important information (at the very least, al-Quso is still hiding his participation in the Malaysia summit). However, O’Neill had been kicked out of Yemen by his superiors a week or two before (see October 14- Late November, 2000), and without his influential presence the Yemeni government will not allow any more interrogations. After 9/11, al-Quso will finally admit to meeting with Alhazmi and Almihdhar. One investigator calls the missed opportunity of exposing the 9/11 plot through al-Quso’s connections “mind-boggling.” 10: Lead FBI case agent Ali Soufan and another agent investigating the bombing of the USS Cole interview a source, referred to later as “Omar,” who previously identified a photo of one of the bombers as al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see November 22-December 16, 2000), but a CIA officer present at the interview fails to add a crucial detail. The interview, which apparently takes place in Pakistan, is held to document the previous identification by Omar of bin Attash, who led the attack on the Cole, based on a photograph provided by Yemeni authorities. The CIA officer present at the meeting is also aware that Omar has identified bin Attash in a surveillance photo taken of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 4, 2001). The identification of bin Attash in the photo taken at the summit is important because it connects bin Attash to 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who were also at the summit, and because it casts light on bin Attash’s interaction 20 with the other Cole bombers. The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later say it believes “that had the FBI known about the identification of [bin Attash] in the Kuala Lumpur photographs, they would likely have sought information about the other participants in the meeting, including Almihdhar and Alhazmi, which could have increased the FBI’s chances of locating them before the September 11 attacks.” The same CIA agent had previously failed to notify the FBI of the identification of bin Attash in the Malaysia summit photo 11: Ali Soufan, a lead investigator into the bombing of the USS Cole, again requests information from the CIA about leads turned up by the investigation. The CIA even has photos from the Malaysia summit of al-Quso standing next to hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, and other photos of bin Attash standing next to Almihdhar. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] However, the CIA does not share any of what they know with Soufan, and Soufan continues to remain unaware the Malaysia summit even took place. Author Lawrence Wright will later comment, “If the CIA had responded to Soufan by supplying him with the intelligence he requested, the FBI would have learned of the Malaysia summit and of the connection to Almihdhar and Alhazmi. The bureau would have learned—as the [CIA] already knew—that the al-Qaeda operatives were in America and had been there for more than a year. Because there was a preexisting indictment for bin Laden in New York, and Almihdhar and Alhazmi were his associates, the bureau already had the authority to follow the suspects, wiretap their apartment, intercept their communications, clone their computer, investigate their contacts—all the essential steps that might have prevented 9/11.” 12: Although three surveillance photographs of al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit are passed to the FBI at this time (see Late May, 2001 and June 11, 2001), another key photograph the CIA has of the meeting is withheld by CIA officers Clark Shannon and Tom Wilshire. The key photograph shows al-Qaeda logistics manager Khallad bin Attash, who commanded the attack on the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will later comment: “Thanks to [FBI agent Ali] Soufan’s interrogation of [USS Cole bomber Fahad al-Quso], the Cole investigators had an active file on Khallad and were preparing to indict him. Knowledge of that fourth photo would likely have prompted [FBI manager John] O’Neill to demand that the CIA turn over all information relating to Khallad and his associates. By withholding the picture of Khallad attending the meeting with the future hijackers [Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi], the CIA may in effect have allowed the September 11th plot to proceed.” 13: Ali Soufan, an FBI agent working on the investigation into the USS Cole bombing, submits a third request to the CIA for information about travel by al-Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia (see Late November 2000 and April 2001). Whereas in previous requests to the CIA he had only asked for information about a possible meeting somewhere in Southeast Asia, he has now developed a much clearer understanding of the relationship between al- Qaeda manager Khallad bin Attash and the Cole conspirators, and correctly suspects some operatives met in Malaysia in January 2000. He asks the CIA about this and about a trip by bin Attash to Bangkok to meet another two members of the Cole bombing team (see January 8-15, 2000). The CIA actually monitored the meeting Soufan suspects took place in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and considered it so important that the CIA director and other top officials were repeatedly briefed about it (see January 6-9, 2000), but the CIA does not respond to his inquiry. FBI managers are also aware of some of this information, including the existence of an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia at the time Soufan suspects one took place, but they apparently do not tell Soufan either (see January 6, 2000). [New Yorker, 7/10/2006 pdf 21 file] Author Lawrence Wright will later say: “The FBI’s investigating the death of 17 American sailors and they’re asking the CIA for information that would solve the crime. And the CIA is refusing, essentially obstructing justice.” 14: On the day of 9/11, FBI agent Ali Soufan happens to be in Yemen, working on the recently reopened USS Cole bombing investigation there. For nearly a year, the CIA had hidden all information about the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia from Soufan (see Late October-Late November 2000 and Early December 2000). On September 12, 2001, he is sent a packet of information containing a complete report about the Malaysia summit and three surveillance photos from it. According to author Lawrence Wright, “When Soufan realized that the [CIA] and some people in the [FBI] had known for more than a year and a half that two of the hijackers were in the [US], he ran into the bathroom and retched.” Using the new information, he interrogates Fahad al-Quso, an attendee of the Malaysia summit, and after a few days al-Quso admits to recognizing 9/11 hijacker Marwan Alshehhi, whom he met in Kandahar, Afghanistan near the end of 1999. Abu Jandal, bin Laden’s bodyguard, happens to be in custody in Yemen as well. After some more days, Jandal tells Soufan everything that he knows about al-Qaeda. He recognizes photos of Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, and four other 9/11 hijackers, from when they were in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. ities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&d osearch=on&search=Go Wohlgemerkt, das waren nur die Eintragungen zu einem einzigen FBI-Mann, Ali Soufan, zu dem es bisher offiziell fast nichts zu lesen gab. Da kommen die anderen FBI'ler ja alle noch. 15: Es wird immer wieder behauptet, das CIA und FBI wären auf Grund der Mauer voneinander getrennt gewesen. Das stimmt aber nicht. Es gab eine Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), und Einheiten wie Squad I-49 und Alex Station, die übergreifend auf die Behörden zugreifen konnten und auch noch auf Bin Laden bzw. das Terrornetzwerk El-Kaida angesetzt waren. January 1996: Squad Uniting Prosecutors and FBI Agents Begins Focusing on Bin Laden Edit event Jack Cloonan.Jack Cloonan. [Source: PBS]The Justice Department directs an existing unit called Squad I-49 to begin building a legal case against bin Laden. This unit is unusual because it combines prosecutors from the Southern District of New York, who have been working on bin Laden related cases, with the FBI’s New York office, which was the FBI branch office that dealt the most with bin Laden -related intelligence. Patrick Fitzgerald effectively directs I-49 as the lead prosecutor. FBI agent Dan Coleman becomes a key member while simultaneously representing the FBI at Alec Station, the CIA’s new bin Laden unit (February 1996) where he has access to the CIA’s vast informational database. [Lance, 2006, pp. 218-219] The other initial members of I-49 are: Louis Napoli, John Anticev, Mike Anticev, Richard Karniewicz, Jack Cloonan, Carl Summerlin, Kevin Cruise, Mary Deborah Doran, and supervisor Tom Lang. All are FBI agents except for Napoli and Summerlin, a New York police detective and a New York state trooper, respectively. The unit will end up working closely with FBI agent John O’Neill, who heads the New York FBI office. Unlike 22 the CIA’s Alec Station, which is focused solely on bin Laden, I-49 has to work on other Middle East -related issues. For much of the next year or so, most members will work on the July 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800, because it crashed near New York and is suspected to have been carried out by Middle Eastern militants (July 17, 1996-September 1996). However, in years to come, I-49 will grow considerably and focus more on bin Laden. [Wright, 2006, pp. 240-241] After 9/11, the “wall” between intelligence collection and criminal prosecution will often be cited for the failure to stop the 9/11 attacks. But as author Peter Lance will later note, “Little more than ten months after the issuance of Jamie Gorelick’s ‘wall memo,’ Fitzgerald and company were apparently disregarding her mandate that criminal investigation should be segregated from intelligence threat prevention. Squad I-49… was actively working both jobs.” Thanks to Coleman’s involvement in both I-49 and the CIA’s Alec Station, I-49 effectively avoids the so-called “wall” problem. [Lance, 2006, pp. 220] 16: Late 1996: Coleman comes to the conclusion that the US is facing a profound new threat. But according to journalist Robert Wright, Coleman’s reports “met with little response outside a small circle of prosecutors and a few people in the [CIA and FBI] who took an interest…” 17: By the start of 1997, Alec Station, the CIA unit created the year before to focus entirely on bin Laden (see February 1996), is certain that bin Laden is not just a financier but an organizer of terrorist activity. It is aware bin Laden is conducting an extensive effort to get and use a nuclear weapon (see Late 1996). It knows that al-Qaeda has a military committee planning operations against US interests worldwide. However, although this information is disseminated in many reports, the unit’s sense of alarm about bin Laden isn’t widely shared or understood within the intelligence and policy communities. Employees in the unit feel their zeal attracts ridicule from their peers. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] Some higher-ups begin to deride the unit as hysterical doomsayers, and refer to the unit as “The Manson Family.” Michael Scheuer, head of the unit until 1999, has an abrasive style. He and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke do not get along and do not work well together. Scheuer also does not get along with John O’Neill, the FBI’s most knowledgeable agent regarding bin Laden. The FBI and Alec Station rarely share information, and at one point an FBI agent is caught stuffing some of the unit’s files under his shirt to take back to O’Neill. 18: July 1998: CIA operatives kidnap Ahmad Salama Mabruk and another member of Islamic Jihad outside a restaurant in Baku, Azerbaijan. This is part of a covert CIA program to arrest Islamic Jihad operatives around the world and send them to Egypt (see 1995). [Wall Street Journal, 7/2/2002] Mabruk is the closest ally of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two leader. Mabruk’s laptop computer turns out to contain al-Qaeda organizational charts and vital information about Islamic Jihad members in Europe. FBI agent Dan Coleman later calls this “the Rosetta Stone of al-Qaeda.” However, the CIA will not turn this information over to the FBI. 19: Ende 1998: FBI counterterrorism expert John O’Neill and his team investigating the 1998 US embassy bombings are repeatedly frustrated by the Saudi government. Guillaume Dasquié, one of the authors of The Forbidden Truth, later tells the Village Voice: “We uncovered incredible things.… Investigators would arrive to find that key witnesses they were about to interrogate had been beheaded the day before.” 20: 6.1.2000 FBI Director Louis Freeh and other top FBI officials are briefed about the 23 ongoing al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) as part of their regular daily update. They are told the CIA is in the lead and that the CIA promises to let the FBI know if an FBI angle to the case develops. But they also are not told that the CIA just found out one of the participants, Khalid Almihdhar, has a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004] One FBI official familiar with the case will later complain, “[The CIA] purposely hid [Almihdhar] from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau.… The thing was, they didn’t want John O’Neill and the FBI running over their case. And that’s why September 11 happened.… They have blood on their hands.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224] Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent in the I-49 squad that focused on al-Qaeda, later says: “If that information [got] disseminated, would it have had an impact on the events of 9/11? I’m telling you that it would have.” 21: The first FBI agents enter Yemen two days after the bombing of the USS Cole in an attempt to discover who was responsible. However, the main part of the team initially gets stuck in Germany because they do not have permission to enter Yemen and they are then unable to accomplish much due to restrictions placed on them and tensions between lead investigator John O’Neill and US Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine. All but about 50 investigators are forced to leave by the end of October. The prime minister of Yemen at the time later claims (see Early October 2001) that hijacker “Khalid Almihdhar was one of the Cole perpetrators, involved in preparations. He was in Yemen at the time and stayed after the Cole bombing for a while, then he left.” The Sunday Times later notes, “The failure in Yemen may have blocked off lines of investigation that could have led directly to the terrorists preparing for September 11.” 22: Das gesamte Herauspressen und Behindern von John O'Neill aus dem FBI. on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions =on&dosearch=on&search=Go 23: Evidence ties Khalifa to the 1995 Bojinka plot and other violent acts, though he has denied all allegations that he is linked to terrorist groups. Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, later claims that not only did Khalifa fund the Islamic Army of Aden, but that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar had ties to the group as well. [Wall Street Journal, 9/19/2001] He further notes that Khalifa went on to from the group after being deported from the US in 1995. “He should never have been allowed to leave US custody.” 24: Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi intelligence minister until shortly before 9/11 (see August 31, 2001), will later claim that al-Qaeda attempts to smuggle weapons into Saudi Arabia to mount attacks on police stations. The plot is uncovered and prevented by Saudi intelligence, and two of the unsuccessful gunrunners, future hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, are watchlisted. [Salon, 10/18/2003; Wright, 2006, pp. 266, 310-311, 448] However, Almihdhar and Alhazmi continue to move in and out of Saudi Arabia unchecked and will obtain US visas there in April 1999 (see 1993-1999 and April 3-7, 1999). The US is supposedly informed of Almihdhar and Alhazmi’s al-Qaeda connection by the end of 1999 25: Hijackers Obtain US Visas: Khalid Almidhar, Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alnami, Saudi citizens, apply twice at Jeddah. Almihdhar’s visa is issued on April 7, and he can thereafter leave and return to the US multiple times until April 6, 2000. [Stern, 8/13/2003] Nawaf 24 Alhazmi gets the same kind of visa; details about Salem are unknown. The CIA claims the hijackers then travel to Afghanistan to participate in “special training” with at least one other suicide bomber on a different mission. The training is led by Khallad bin Attash, who applies for a US visa on April 3 from Yemen, but fails to get one (see April 3, 1999). The CIA will learn about Almihdhar’s visa in January 2000 (see January 2-5, 2000). 26: The Jeddah Consulate keeps in its records the fact that Nawaf and Alhazmi obtain US visas several days before Almihdhar, but apparently these records are never searched before 9/11. Jeddah ist laut Michael Springman dafür bekannt, falsche Visas für Agenten auszustellen. 27: August 1998: 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar makes a series of calls to an al-Qaeda communications hub run by his father-in-law, Ahmed al-Hada. A Yemeni police official will later tell Agence France-Presse that Almihdhar “made a number of overseas calls to Ahmed al-Hada, who was then in Sana’a, before, during, and after” the African embassy bombings (see August 7, 199 . Al-Hada is involved in the embassy bombings and the US intelligence community begins joint surveillance of his phone after the bombings (see Late August 199 , although the NSA may already have been monitoring it (see Before August 7, 199 . The calls made by Almihdhar are from overseas and the FBI learns of this, presumably during the investigation into the embassy bombings (see August 5-25, 199 [Agence France Presse, 2/15/2002] Around this time Almihdhar is also in contact with al-Hada’s son, Samir, who is his brother-in-law, and the Yemen Times will later report that these contacts are monitored. However, it is not clear whether this is just by local authorities in Yemen, or also by US intelligence. 28: August 1998: The investigation of the East Africa embassy bombings (see August 7, 199 led to the discovery of the phone number of an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen (see August 5-25, 199 . The hub is run by an al-Qaeda veteran named Ahmed al-Hada, who is helped by his son Samir and is related to many other al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen and elsewhere. He is also the father in law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, whose wife, Hoda al-Hada, lives at the hub with their children. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; MSNBC, 7/21/2004; Suskind, 2006, pp. 94; Wright, 2006, pp. 277, 309, 343, 378] Several of Ahmed al-Hada’s relatives die fighting for al-Qaeda before 9/11, a fact known to US intelligence. [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005; Guardian, 2/15/2006] The NSA may already be aware of the phone number, as they have been intercepting bin Laden’s communications for some time (see November 1996-Late August 199 and, according to Newsweek, “some” of bin Laden’s 221 calls to Yemen are to this phone number. [Newsweek, 2/18/2002; Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002; Media Channel, 9/5/2006] The US intelligence community now begins a joint effort to monitor the number. The NSA and CIA jointly plant bugs inside the house, tap the phones, and monitor visitors with spy satellites. [Mirror, 6/9/2002; Wright, 2006, pp. 343; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 pdf file] US intelligence also learns that the communications hub is an al-Qaeda “logistics center,” used by agents around the world to communicate with each other and plan attacks. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002] The joint effort enables the FBI to map al-Qaeda’s global organization (see Late 1998-Early 2002) and at least three of the hijackers use the number, enabling the NSA to intercept their communications and find out about an important al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia (see December 29, 1999 and January 5-8, 2000 and Early 2000-Summer 2001). It appears al-Qaeda continues to use this phone line until Samir al-Hada dies resisting arrest in early 2002 25 29: Helped by the NSA, it stakes out the house—tapping the phone, planting bugs, and taking satellite photographs of its visitors. However, the CIA apparently does not provide the FBI with all the relevant information it is obtaining about al-Qaeda’s plans. [Mirror, 6/9/2002; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 pdf file] For example, the FBI is not informed that hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi make calls to the communications hub from the US between spring 2000 and summer 2001 (see Spring-Summer 2000 and Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001). 30: The FBI also asks the NSA to pass any calls between the communications hub and the US to the FBI, but the NSA does not do this either (see Late 199 . [Suskind, 2006, pp. 94] 31: Herbst 1999: Prince Turki al Faisal, Saudi intelligence minister until shortly before 9/11 (see August 31, 2001), will later claim that around this time its external intelligence agency tells the CIA that hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have been put on a Saudi terror watch list. Saeed Badeeb, Turki’s chief analyst, and Nawaf Obaid, a security consultant to the Saudi government, support Turki’s account though Turki himself will later back away from it after becoming the Saudi ambassador to the US “What we told [the CIA] was these people were on our watch list from previous activities of al-Qaeda, in both the embassy bombings and attempts to smuggle arms into the kingdom in 1997,” (see 1997 and October 4, 2001). However, the CIA strongly denies any such warning, although it begins following Almihdhar and Alhazmi around this time (see January 2-5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000). [Associated Press, 10/16/2003; Salon, 10/18/2003; Wright, 2006, pp. 310-311, 448] The US will not put Almihdhar and Alhazmi on its watch list until August 2001 (see August 23, 2001). 32: Herbst 1999: 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar tells another operative that al-Qaeda is planning a ship-bombing attack. The US will learn this from a detainee interviewed in December 2001. The detainee will say that Almihdhar informed him that al-Qaeda operative Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was the plot’s originator. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 491] Al-Nashiri discussed the ship bombing attack in a telephone call made in late 1998. The call may have been to the al-Qaeda communications hub at which Almihdhar lived and may also have been picked up by the US (see (Mid-August 199 ). Al-Qaeda soon attempts to attack the USS The Sullivans in Aden, Yemen, but the plan fails (see January 3, 2000). Almihdhar, who will be accused of participating in the plot to bomb the USS Cole in Yemen (see October 12, 2000, Early October 2001 and October 4, 2001), travels to Yemen shortly before the attack on the Sullivans (see November/December 1999) and apparently leaves one day after it (see January 2-5, 2000). Unbehelligt, nicht angeklagt. 33: 11. Dezember 1999: The CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center sends a cable reminding all its personnel about various reporting obligations. The cable clearly states that it is important to share information so suspected members of US-designated terrorist groups can be placed on watch lists. The US keeps a number of watch lists; the most important one, TIPOFF, contains about 61,000 names of suspected terrorists by 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/2002; Knight Ridder, 1/27/2004] The list is checked whenever someone enters or leaves the US “The threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” and even a “reasonable suspicion” that a 26 person is connected with a US-designated terrorist group warrants being added to the database. [US Congress, 9/20/2002] Within a month, two future hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, will be identified as al-Qaeda operatives (see December 29, 1999), but the cable’s instructions will not be followed for them. The CIA will initially tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that no such guidelines existed, and CIA Director Tenet will fail to mention the cable in his testimony to the Inquiry. [New York Times, 5/15/2003; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 pdf file] Noch mal extra wegen der unglaublichen Lüge, warum sie auf keiner Terrorverdächtigen-Liste standen. 34: A neighbor of Abdussattar Shaikh, a Muslim leader and also undercover FBI asset living in San Diego, later remembers Shaikh having introduced him to a friend called Hani, who he assumes to have been Hanjour. [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/2001] (Alhazmi and Almihdhar stay with Shaikh during 2000 (see Mid-May-December 2000).) 35: A US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identifies five al-Qaeda terrorist cells; one of them has connections to Brooklyn, New York and will become informally known as the “Brooklyn” cell by the Able Danger team. This cell includes 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. According to a former intelligence officer who claims he worked closely with Able Danger, the link to Brooklyn is not based upon any firm evidence, but computer analysis that established patterns in links between the four men. “[T]he software put them all together in Brooklyn.” [New York Times, 8/9/2005; Washington Times, 8/22/2005; Fox News, 8/23/2005; Government Security News, 9/2005] 36: The CIA is aware that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is staying at a highly monitored al- Qaeda communication hub (see Late 1998-Early 2002) and is planning to travel to an al- Qaeda meeting in Malaysia. He is closely watched as leaves the hub and flies from Sana’a, Yemen, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on his way to Malaysia. Agents from eight CIA offices and six friendly foreign intelligence services are all asked to help track him, in the hopes he will lead them to bigger al-Qaeda figures. [Stern, 8/13/2003; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 pdf file] The CIA and local authorities are running an operation to track militants transiting Dubai airport (see 1999), and United Arab Emirates officials secretly make copies of his passport as he is passing through it, immediately reporting this to the CIA. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224] Another account suggests CIA agents break into Almihdhar’s Dubai hotel room and photocopy the passport there. Either way, the information is immediately faxed to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. [Wright, 2006, pp. 244] The CIA not only learns his full name, but also discovers the vital fact that he has a multiple entry visa to the US that is valid from April 1999 to April 2000. But even though the CIA now knows about this US visa which indicates he plans to go to New York City, they do not place him on a terror watch list and they fail to tell the FBI about the visa. Eigentlich drei Punkte, wobei zwei davon schon vorkamen. Wichtig hier: Wenn man jemanden beobachtet, kann man ihn auch verhaften. Das ist laut Stern nicht geschehen, weil man ihn als Lockvogel nutzen wollte. Inwieweit das stimmt... 37: On January 4, a CIA cable containing the photocopy is sent from the CIA’s Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, office to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. An FBI agent named Doug Miller assigned to the unit sees the cable and drafts a memo requesting the required permission from the CIA to advise the rest of the FBI that one participant in the Malaysia summit would likely be traveling soon to the US. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 pdf file; 9/11 Commission, 27 7/24/2004, pp. 502; Wright, 2006, pp. 244] Miller further writes that Almihdhar’s visa indicates he will be traveling to New York City and that he has been connected to the 1998 embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001) and the monitored al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late 1998-Early 2002). He also writes that photos of Almihdhar have been obtained and will be sent as well. However, a headquarters desk officer tells him that a deputy unit chief, Tom Wilshire, does not want it sent yet, and that, “This is not a matter for the FBI.” Dass dem FBI weder Foto noch Namen mitgeteilt wurden ist altbekannt, hier ist nur noch eine weitere Gelegenheit dokumentiert, wo das von Higher-Ups verhindert wurde. 38: Der gleiche Fall, eine Woche später eine Nachfrage, die unbeantwortet bleibt: A week later, Miller follows up by sending his rejected memo to Wilshire. Miller asks, “Is this a no go or should I remake it in some way?” He never gets an answer and drops the matter. [Wright, 2006, pp. 311] The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a “significant failure” but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 250 pdf file] 39: Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, sends a cable to a number of friendly intelligence agencies around the world. The cable also says that Almihdhar’s travel documents have been given to the FBI. But in fact the FBI does not know about the visa, and Alec Station is clearly aware that the FBI does not know 40: a US Treasury press release in 2003 will state that “[Hambali] was videotaped in a January 2000 meeting in Malaysia with two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers of AA Flight 77 - Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi.” [US Department of the Treasury, 1/24/2003 pdf file] Malaysia will give the CIA a copy of the tape about one month after the summit ends (see February 2000). By 1999, the FBI had connected Hambali to the 1995 Bojinka plot and also obtained a photo of him (see May 23, 1999). Yet the CIA will not share this video footage with the FBI nor will they warn Malaysian intelligence about Hambali’s Bojinka plot connection (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). 41: On the night of January 5, 2000, a CIA officer known as “James” who has been assigned to the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) to deal with problems “in communicating between the CIA and the FBI” briefs an FBI agent who works in the FBI’s bin Laden unit (which is part of the SIOC at that time) about a number of cables he has received regarding the al-Qaeda summit that is just starting in Malaysia and one of the people attending it, hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. The CIA agent writes an e-mail to several other CIA agents and details “exactly” what he briefed this person on. Although the CIA should inform the FBI of a terrorist like Almihdhar having a US visa, he does not mention discussing the visa with the FBI agent, even though he has just seen several CIA cables talking about it. The FBI agent will later say he does not know why James chooses to brief him, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. Overnight, another CIA cable comes in to him providing new details about Almihdhar and the Malaysia summit. The next morning, the CIA agent briefs a different FBI agent in the SIOC about these new developments. Again, records indicate he fails to mention anything about Almihdhar’s US visa. This FBI agent will also say he does not know why he was briefed on the matter, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. James then sends an e-mail to other CIA agents describing “exactly” what he told both of the FBI agents. One section of his e-mail reads, “Thus far, a lot of suspicious activity 28 has been observed [in Malaysia] but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. I told the first FBI agent that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop. Like [the first FBI agent] yesterday, [the second FBI agent] stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the loop.” Due to the briefings James gives, another CIA officer assigned to the FBI will not bother to brief the FBI on Almihdhar (see January 6, 2000). After 9/11, James will refuse to talk to the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General, but will tell the CIA’s inspector general that he has no recollection of these events. Das sieht wie eine altbekannte Mossad-Taktik aus: Briefe den Agenten mit Informationen, lasse wesentliches weg, so dass der Agent meint, er sei gebrieft worden und wisse alles. In Wirklichkeit hat auch hier niemand vom FBI erfahren, wer alles an dem Treffen in Malaysia teilnahm. Hier ist eine der wichtigsten Ermittlungsverhinderungen, die nie aufgeklärt worden sind! Hätte man Vor- und Zunamen weitergegeben, wäre der ganze 911-Plot aufgeflogen. Inkompetenz? Man entscheide selbst! 42: A series of calls by al-Qaeda operatives, some of whom are under surveillance by the CIA and the Malaysian Special Branch at this time, links three sites involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. Even though the CIA is aware of the calls, it will later say it is unable to find the hijackers in Bangkok, the location of one of the call sites. The calls made by the operatives are between the following three locations: bullet A payphone in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, near an apartment where about a dozen al- Qaeda operatives are holding a summit (see January 5-8, 2000); bullet The Washington Hotel in Bangkok, Thailand. Al-Qaeda operatives Ibrahim al-Thawar and Fahad al-Quso are staying at the hotel around this time and will go on to be involved in the Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). They are later joined in the hotel by summit attendees Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Khallad bin Attash; bullet Al-Quso’s house in Yemen. The calls from the payphone to this location are made by bin Attash. Although bin Attash and possibly others call the Washington Hotel while they are under surveillance, the CIA will be unable to locate them there during the week they spend in Bangkok, from January 8-15 (see January 8-15, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will comment, “Although the CIA later denied that it knew anything about the phone, the number was recorded in the Malaysians’ surveillance log, which was given to the agency.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 156-160, 181-2; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 pdf file] The FBI team investigating the Cole bombing will later learn some of this information before 9/11 and ask the CIA for details. However, the CIA will fail to disclose what it knows about the Malaysia summit or that it looks for the hijackers and associates in Thailand after January 8 (see July 2001). 43: Man log über die weitere Verfolgung der Treffenteilnehmer: “On January 14, the head of the CIA’s al-Qaeda unit again updated his bosses, telling them that officials were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to various countries.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 237] Officially, the CIA will later claim to have lost hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they left the meeting (see January 8, 2000), however, Almihdhar will later report back to al-Qaeda that he thought he was followed to the US (see Mid-July 2000). It has never been reported if any of the other attendees were monitored after leaving the meeting or not. 29 44: Wieder mal Inkompetenz: The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, traveling under their real names. Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash also travels with them and the three sit side by side in the airplane, but bin Attash travels under the false name “Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf” (see After January 8, 2000). [Associated Press, 9/20/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 pdf file; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 pdf file] However, the CIA fails to alert anyone that they should be followed. Apparently, no one is Thailand is warned about their arrival until after they have already disappeared into Bangkok. The CIA is told by Malaysian intelligence that Khalid Almihdhar was on the flight, as well as someone with the last name Alhazmi. For the third person, the CIA is given part of bin Attash’s “Salah” alias. But apparently no one puts Nawaf’s first name together with his last name Alhamzi, even though he sat next to the known Khalid Almihdhar and his real full name was on the flight manifest. 45: Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar arrive in Thailand from Malaysia, where they were monitored while attending an al-Qaeda summit there (see January 8, 2000). Khallad bin Attash, who flew there with them, is met in Bangkok by two al-Qaeda operatives, Ibrahim al-Thawar and Fahad al-Quso, who give him $36,000. Some of this money may be passed on to Alhazmi and Almihdhar for their upcoming work in the US. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 159] These two men who meet him happen to be plotters of the bombing of the USS Cole later in the year, though US intelligence will not learn about this until long after the Cole bombing. [Wright, 2006, pp. 312] The CIA attempts to find Almihdhar and his companions in Thailand but are unsuccessful because, as one official will later put it, “when they arrived we were unable to mobilize what we needed to mobilize.” On January 13, a CIA official will notify superiors that surveillance of the men is continuing. Additionally, that same day the Thai government puts Almihdhar’s name on a watch list in case he tries to fly out of Bangkok. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 247 pdf file] But despite being on this watch list, Almihdhar is able to fly to the US two days later, travelling with Nawaf Alhazmi and using his own name (see January 15, 2000). Bin Attash flies undetected to Karachi, Pakistan, on January 20. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 pdf file] 46: In February, the CIA will reject a request from foreign authorities to give assistance in the search. The CIA will stop what search there is in early March when the Thai government tells the CIA that Almihdhar has already flown to the US (see Liest ja eh keiner durch. Zeigt aber, dass man den Plot jahrelang vorher schon sorgfältig vor Enttarnung schützte. Womit wir zu Punkt 11 kommen. Die vermeintliche Terroristen-Gruppe war von Anfang an von den Geheimdiensten im Blick und auch unterwandert- vermutlich sogar gesteuert.

Die vermeintliche Terroristen-Gruppe war von Anfang an von den Geheimdiensten im Blick und auch unterwandert- vermutlich sogar gesteuert.

Nun, das Überwachen selbst ist ja "normale" Geheimdienstarbeit. Zum Beispiel hat das NSA seit 1998 alle Gespräche des sogenannten Yemen-Hub abgehört und damit alles über die mutmaßlichen 911 Hijackern Al-Midhar und Al-Hamzi gewusst. Ist natürlich schon bezeichnend, wenn herauskommt, dass nicht nur der NSA, sondern beispielsweise auch der BND schon 1998 Atta überwachen liess oder der Mossad Tür an Tür mit Atta wohnte. Was aber weniger bekannt ist: Es gibt eine lange Tradition in den USA, Terroristengruppen zu unterwandern. Vermutlich nicht nur dort, aber da bin ich am besten informiert. Angefangen hat es Ende der 80'er. Der erste "islamistische" Terroranschlag in den USA, den wir der späteren "Täter/Sündenbockgruppe" zuordnen können, galt Rabbi Kahane, der Mörder war ein gewisser El Syyid Nosair. In einem Artikel der Village Voice von 1993 (hier gespiegelt) erfahren wir, dass man seit dem Kennedy-Mord nicht mehr so sehr die "Lone Gunman" Theorie seitens der Ermittlungsbehörden propagiert hatte, um eine Verschwörung auszuschließen und damit die tatsächlich existente Terrorgruppe vor Enttarnung zu schützen. Als Argument für die niederen Ermittlungsränge kann man immer anführen, man wolle seine Kontaktleute nicht gefährden und es wäre besser, es weiterlaufen zu lassen als die Kontrolle mittels Bloßstellen und strafrechtlicher Verfolgung solcher Gruppen zu verlieren. (übrigens hat man die gleiche Logik auch beim gescheiteren NPD-Verbot in Deutschland bemüht!) "I haven't seen the lone-gunman theory advocated [so forcefully] since John F. Kennedy." Hätte man die Wohnung in Brooklyn durchsucht, wäre man auf die komplette WTC93- Geschichte, auf Ramzi Yousef und damit den Vorgängern bzw. Planern des 11.9.2001 gestoßen. Auch der später verurteilte blinde Sheisch Abdel Rahman war ein CIA-Mann und Undercover. (Link siehe oben. Auch ein gewisser Zakhary war FBI-Informant.) "Why aren't we going after the sheikh [Abdel Rahman]?" demanded the undercover man. "It's hands-off," answered the agent. "Why?" asked the operative. "It was no accident that the sheikh got a visa and that he's still in the country," replied the agent, visibly upset. "He's here under the banner of national security, the State Department, the NSA [National Security Agency], and the CIA." The agent pointed out that the sheikh had been granted a tourist visa, and later a green card, despite the fact that he was on a State Department terrorist watch-list that should have barred him from the country. He's 31 an untouchable, concluded the agent. Weitere Infiltratoren in diese Gruppe: Ali Mohamed: How the FBI protected Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Hijacking Trainer New Revelations about Ali Mohamed by Dr. Peter Dale Scott


  • * * * *

Thursday October 28, 1993 Page A1 "Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast" By Ralph Blumenthal Mr. Salem, a 43-year-old former Egyptian Army officer, was used by the Government [of the United States] to penetrate a circle of Muslim extremists who are now charged in two bombing cases: the World Trade Center attack, and a foiled plot to destroy the United Nations, the Hudson River tunnels, and other New York City landmarks. He is the crucial witness in the second bombing case, but his work for the Government was erratic, and for months before the World Trade Center blast, he was feuding with the F.B.I. Supervisor `Messed It Up' Emad Salem hat dankenswerteweise all seine FBI-Kontakte auf Tonband aufgenommen, sonst wäre er wohl heute nicht mehr am Leben.

Randy Glass: Randy Glass is a con artist turned government informant participating in a sting called Operation Diamondback. [Palm Beach Post, 9/29/01] He discusses an illegal weapons deal with an Egyptian American named Mohamed el Amir. In wiretapped conversations, Mohamed discusses the need to get false papers to disguise a shipment of illegal weapons. His brother, Dr. Magdy el Amir, has been a wealthy neurologist in Jersey City for the past twenty years. Two other weapons dealers later convicted in sting operation involving Glass also lived in Jersey City, and both el Amirs admit knowing one of them, Diaa Mohsen (see June 12, 2001). Mohsen has been paid at least once by Dr. el Amir. In 1998, Congressman Ben Gilman was given a foreign intelligence report suggesting that Dr. el Amir owns an HMO that is 32 secretly funded by bin Laden, and that money is being skimmed from the HMO to fund terrorist activities. The state of New Jersey later buys the HMO and determines that $15 million were unaccounted for and much of that has been diverted into hard-to-trace offshore bank accounts. However, investigators working with Glass are never given the report about Dr. el Amir. Both el Amirs have not been charged with any crime. Mohamed now lives in Egypt and Magdy continues to practice medicine in New Jersey. Glass's sting, which began in late 1998, will uncover many interesting leads before ending in June 2001 (see also July 14, 1999, Early August 2001 and August 2, 2002). [MSNBC, 8/2/02] July 14, 1999: US government informant Randy Glass records a conversation at a dinner attended by him, illegal arms dealers Diaa Mohsen and Mohammed Malik (see June 12, 2001), a former Egyptian judge named Shireen Shawky, and ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas, held at a restaurant within view of the WTC. FBI agents pretending to be restaurant customers sit at nearby tables. [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02, MSNBC, 8/2/02] Abbas says he wants to buy a whole shipload of weapons stolen from the US military to give to bin Laden. [Cox News, 8/2/02] Abbas points to the WTC and says, "Those towers are coming down." This ISI agent later makes two other references to an attack on the WTC. [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02, Cox News, 8/2/02, Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02] Abbas also says "Americans [are] the enemy," and, "We would have no problem with blowing up this entire restaurant because it is full of Americans." [MSNBC, 3/18/03] The meeting is secretly recorded, and parts are shown on television in 2003 (see also August 17, 1999). [MSNBC, 3/18/03 (B)]

Abduss Attar Sheikh Zitat: The neigbors in San Diego grew suspicious. Al-Hazmi and Al-Midhar lived in the apartment complex for eight months and still didn't have any furniture. They slept on the floor and regularly made calls from phone booths even though they had a phone in their apartment. The two Saudis apparently noticed the skeptical glances of their neighbors. They terminated the lease and moved in with Abduss Attar Sheikh, a Muslim they met at the Mosque in San Diego. This friend, a retired English teacher, rented them a room and helped them open a bank account and get Internet access. As it turned out, the retiree was also helping out the local FBI. He was providing the police information on militant Muslims in San Diego. His contact officer regularly visited him at home.

Melvin Lattimore (Marvin Lattimore) Zitat: 33 US PROVOCATEUR FOR AL-QAEDA FREED FOR NEW TERROR MISSION? [...] John Richter was also instrumental in protecting Melvin Lattimore, another FBI provocateur involved with Ali Mohammed in the 1993 WTC and 1995 OKC bombings. Richter was brought to OKC in October 2001 by the DOJ to prosecute Lattimore for a firearms violation. But at the time of Lattimore’s conviction the FBI and DOJ as well as Richter and AG Ashcroft knew that Lattimore had been used as an FBI provocateur together with Ali Mohammed in the 1993 WTC and the 1995 OKC bombing. They also knew that Lattimore was the roommate of 9/11 hijackers Moussaoui, AlShehhi and AlHazmi and had been with Mohammed Atta in Norman OK just before the 9/11 attacks. Richter’s 2001 prosecution of Lattimore was done to get Lattimore out of the limelight to avoid press and public scrutiny of FBI, CIA and DOJ corruption, murder and treason involving these attacks with Ali Mohammed and Melvin Lattimore. Thanks to the GW Bush DOJ, AG Gonzales and John Richter, Ali Mohammed and Melvin Lattimore were not fully prosecuted, did not serve the full time required for their crimes and now are free once again to work together and roam the streets of America and OKC to monitor and perhaps provoke yet another terror attack in America. [...]

Es gibt derer noch mehr, doch damit genug an dieser Stelle. Man sieht, die Geheimdienste und Antiterroreinheiten des FBI haben nicht nur beobachtet, sondern aktiv an der Unterwanderung der Terrorzellen gearbeitet, dabei akzeptablen Erfolg gehabt. Diese Unterwanderung kann man natürlich auch als Steuerung mißbrauchen, so wie es bei Emad Salem auf jeden Fall aussieht. Hinterher zu behaupten, man wäre "überrascht" worden, erfordert schon eine gewisse Chupze.

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